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OR CONTRIBUTED TO THE

The concept of standing, derived from article III of the
United States Constitution,' limits the power of the judiciary to
address only "cases"

or "controversies." ' 2 Standing doctrine,

therefore, restricts judicial resolution to cases where the litigants
have a personal stake in the outcome.3 This "personal interest"
requirement facilitates a court's adjudicative duties by assuring
that the issues will be fully developed and sharpened through the
adversarial process.4
Debate over what constitutes an actual
"case" or "controversy" has effectuated the fragmented development of a three part standing test. Courts have been reluctant to
1 U.S. CONST. art. III states in

pertinent part:

The Judicial Power shall extend . . .to Controversies to which the
United States shall be a Party; - to Controversies between two or
more States; between a State and Citizens of another State; between
Citizens of different States, - between Citizens of the same State
claiming Land under Grants of different States, and between a State,
or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
2 SeeJ. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA &J. YOUNG, CONSTrrTUTIONAL LAW § 2.12, at 55-56
(2d ed. 1986) [hereinafter Nowak, Rotunda & Young]. See also L. TRIBE, CONSTrrUTIONAL CHOICES 99 (1985) ("standing ...is conceived as an application of Article
III's 'case or controversy' requirement"); Beers, Standing and Related ProceduralHurdles in Environmental Litigation, 1 ENVTL. L. & LITIGATION 65, 66 (1986); Comment,
Justice Scalia: Standing, Environmental Law, and the Supreme Court, 15 B.C. ENVTL. AFF.
L. REV. 135, 136 (1987) (article III standing "restricts courts to hearing only cases
or controversies").
3 Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 731-32 (1972); See Comment, supra note
2, at 136.
4 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962). Justice Brennan conveyed the essence of the standing issue in Baker by emphasizing that standing assures "that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court
so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions." Id. Arti-

cle III additionally ensures that the judiciary will not act as a legislator by addressing abstract questions properly left to the legislative branch pursuant to the
separation of powers doctrine. See Nowak, Rotunda & Young, supra note 2, § 2.12,
at 56. See also Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975) (standing originates in a
concern regarding the proper role of the courts in our governmental system); Comment, supra note 2, at 139 (standing restrains the judiciary from engaging in government policy debates) (citing 3 H. JOHNSTON, CORRESPONDENCE AND PUBLIC
PAPERS OF JOHN JAY 486-89 (1891)).
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grant a litigant standing unless the party can show an injury in
fact which is both fairly traceable to the defendant's conduct and
capable of judicial redress. 5
Standing doctrine has traditionally been ridden with tension
and debate. Despite an eagerness to address environmental
problems, courts have struggled to apply the standing test to environmental suits within the confines of article III. Thus,
although an environmental injury may be widespread and untraceable to a single polluter,6 courts have relaxed the standing
requirements so that these wrongs may be addressed. 7 The result is an inconsistent application of standing doctrine8 guided
5 Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church
and State, 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982). Even if the formal requirements of article III
standing are satisfied, a court will exercise restraint and refuse to review a case
unless it determines that standing is proper in light of certain prudential considerations. See id. at 474; Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975). See also Nowak,
Rotunda & Young, supra, note 2, § 2.12, at 55-56. There are three prudential considerations upon which courts will deny standing. First, courts will deny standing
to plaintiffs alleging a "generalized grievance" shared equally by many persons. See
Warth, 422 U.S. at 499. Second, standing will not be proper where plaintiffs assert
the rights and interests of third parties. Id. Third, courts will deny standing where
the harm alleged does not "fall within 'the zone of interests to be protected or
regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question.' " Valley Forge, 454
U.S. at 475 (quoting Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S.
150, 153 (1973)). While these limitations may determine the outcome of the standing analysis, these factors cannot be substituted for the tripartite constitutional test,
without which standing cannot exist. Id.
The Third Circuit did not address the prudential limitations of standing in
Public Interest Research Group of New Jersey, Inc. v. Powell Duffryn Terminals,
913 F.2d 64 (3rd Cir. 1990), cert. denied, Ill S.Ct. 1018 (1991), because the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA), under which suit was brought, specifically
grants standing to the limits of article III of the Constitution. See id. at 70 n.3.
Thus, this aspect of standing doctrine will not be discussed in this Note.
6 Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 738 (1972) (aesthetic and recreational
injury is a sufficient injury in fact to confer standing); United States v. Students
Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669, 686-87 (1973)
(a widely shared interest does not defeat standing).
7 See Davis, The Liberalized Law of Standing, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 450, 450 (1970);
Scott, Standing in the Supreme Court - A Functional Analysis, 86 HARV. L. REV. 645,
645-46 (1973). Compare Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397
U.S. 150, 153-54 (1970) with Kansas City Power & Light Co. v. McKay, 225 F.2d
925 (1955). See also Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 39
(1976) (injury in fact requirement substantially broadened access to courts). See infra notes 54-66 and accompanying text.
8 Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976) (standing denied where plaintiffs failed to show that relief requested would remedy the alleged
injury); Compare Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975) (standing denied where plaintiff's ability to purchase desired housing depended on financial capability, not on
builders ability to construct affordable housing) with Village of Arlington Heights v.
Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977) (standing granted where
plaintiffs specifically alleged that zoning prevented a particular builder from con-
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only by result-oriented reasoning. 9
Recently, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third

Circuit demonstrated its willingness to liberally interpret the causation tier of standing in an environmental context.'° In Public
Interest Research Group of New Jersey, Inc. v. Powell Duffryn Terminals
Inc.," the Third Circuit addressed whether individual members
of the Public Interest Research Group, Inc. (PIRG), a group concerned with the welfare of the environment, had standing to sue
Powell Duffryn Terminals Inc. (PDT), a New Jersey corporation,
for emitting pollutants which exceeded the corporation's National Pollutant
Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit
2
limits.'

The court applied the three prong test for individual

standing and held that PIRG had adequately shown a substantial
likelihood that PDT emitted pollutants exceeding permissible
levels, which caused and contributed to PIRG's recreational and
aesthetic injuries."3 The court further determined that a judgment in favor of PIRG would redress the alleged harm. 4 Consequently, the court granted standing to PIRG. 5
PDT operated a chemical storage facility adjacent to the Kill
structing a planned project); Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 6 (1973) (standing
denied to group of mothers seeking to force fathers to pay child support since relief
sought would only jail the fathers and not result in payment of support).
9 Nichol, Causation as a Standing Requirement: The Unprincipled Use of Judicial Restraint, 69 Ky. L.J. 185, 186 (1980). Critics assert that the United States Supreme
Court's inconsistent application of standing is a product of manipulation. Id. The
Court, by allowing its view of the merits to factor into its standing analysis, is able
to choose which issues it will address. L. TRIBE, CONSTITurIONAL CHOICES 99-100
(1985); Tushnet, The New Law of Standing: A Plea for Abandonment, 62 CORNELL L.
REV. 663, 663-64 (1977); Comment, supra note 2, at 137.
10 Comment, supra note 2, at 144. See also Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727
(1972) (widely shared injury sufficient to confer standing); United States v. SCRAP,
412 U.S. 669 (1973) (standing granted despite widespread harm and tenuous
causal relationship); Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S.
59 (1977) (standing established by showing a substantial likelihood that defendant
caused plaintiff's injuries).
11 913 F.2d 64 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1018 (1991).
12 Id. at 73. The court of appeals noted that PIRG members had testified that an
oily sheen existed on the Kill Van Kull. Id. The court additionally observed that
PDT had violated its permit numerous times, discharging oil and grease into the
Kill Van Kull. Id.
13 Id. at 71-73. Historically, causation has been established by showing a "substantial likelihood" that plaintiff's injury was caused by defendant's conduct. Duke
Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 74 (1977). See also
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977) (standing granted where substantial likelihood existed that the requested relief would
remedy the alleged wrong).
14 913 F.2d at 72.
15

Id.
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Van Kull, a body of water bordering Bayonne, New Jersey. 6 The
facility stored large amounts of liquids for third parties.' 7 At the
owner's request, the chemicals were transported by tankers along
the Kill Van Kull. 1 8 During the transfer, chemicals leaked from
the tankers and polluted the Kill Van Kull. ' 9 Although PDT was
permitted to discharge chemicals into the Kill Van Kull, 20 reports
indicated that the leakage consistently exceeded permit
restrictions. 2 '
On January 27, 1984, PIRG instituted a citizen suit in the
United States District Court for the District of NewJersey seeking
to enforce PDT's discharge permit as well as civil remedies and
injunctive relief. 22 Judge Ackerman found that PIRG had
16 Student Pub. Interest Research Group of New Jersey, Inc. v. Powell Duffryn
Terminals Inc., 627 F. Supp. 1074, 1079 (D.N.J. 1986)[hereinafter PIRG 1].
17 Id. at 1080.
18 Id.
19 Id. Additional discharges resulted from the condensation of steam in PDT's
collection system and tank overflow. Id. These discharges were ultimately washed
into the Kill Van Kull by rainwater. Id.
20 PDT's discharge permit was originally issued to PDT's predecessor in interest, El Dorado Terminals Inc. Id. At the time that PDT acquired El Dorado, an
injunction issued by the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey
required the owner to construct a waste water treatment facility by July 1, 1977.
913 F.2d at 69 (citing United States v. El Dorado Terminals Corp., No. 77-228
(D.N.J. 1977)). Although PDT constructed ditches to channel rainwater, it failed to
meet the requirements of the injunction until 1987. PIRG I, 627 F. Supp. at 1080.
21 Discharge monitoring reports (DMRs), filed pursuant to the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES), evidenced 369 violations of PDT's
1975, 1981 and 1986 permits. Public Interest Research Group of NewJersey, Inc.
v. Powell Duffryn Terminals Inc., 720 F. Supp. 1158, 1160 (D.N.J. 1989)[hereinafter PIRG II]. The violations included the following effluents:
PARAMETERS
NUMBER OF VIOLATIONS
Total Organic Carbon (TOC)
8
pH
63
Total Suspended Solids (TSS)
66
Bioassay
1
Oil and Grease
48
Hexavalent Chromium
2
Petroleum Hydrocarbons
27
Methylene Chloride
9
Phenol
I
Biochemical Oxygen Demand (BOD)
80
Chemical Oxygen Demand (COD)
81

386
Id. at 1161.
22 PIRG 1, 627 F. Supp. at 1078. PIRG filed its complaint pursuant to section
1365 of the FWPCA which provides in pertinent part:
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section and section
131 9 (g)( 6 ) of this title, any citizen may commence a civil action on his
own behalf-
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demonstrated standing to sue on behalf of its members and, accordingly, denied PDT's motion to dismiss. 2 ' Applying the three
part test for individual standing, the judge first determined that
PIRG had sufficiently proven an actual injury. 24 Next, Judge
Ackerman concluded that the causation prong of the standing
test was satisfied merely by showing that PDT violated its permits. 2 5 Judge Ackerman explained that when there are numerous

contributing polluters, a plaintiff is not required to isolate and
identify the defendant's liability percentage.2 6 Finally, the districtjudge concluded that a liability judgment against PDT would
redress the alleged harm and, concomitantly, benefit the general
public by deterring others from polluting the Kill. 27
(1) against any person ... who is alleged to be in violation of (A)
an effluent standard or limitation under this chapter or (B) an
order issued by the Administrator or a state with respect to such a
standard or limitation ....
33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(1) (1982). PIRG alleged that PDT had continually violated
Sections 301 and 402 of the FWPCA. PIRG I, 627 F. Supp. at 1078.
23 Id. at 1083.
24 Id. at 1081-82. The plaintiffs presented documented evidence of the recreational and aesthetic harm to PIRG members resulting from their residence near the
Kill Van Kull or their use of the adjacent park. Id. The court also reviewed several
statements from members of the plaintiff groups. Id. For example, Cheryl Cummings, a member of NJPIRG, testified that her enjoyment of the park was diminished by the poor water quality of the Kill. Id. at 1081. Additionally, Sheldon
Abrams, a member of Friends of the Earth, testified that the water had an "oily
sheen" and that his boating and fishing interests have been curtailed because of the
pollution. Id. at 1082. Andrew Gerbino, also a member of Friends of the Earth,
testified that he believed the value of his Staten Island real estate was diminished by
the condition of the Kill and Lower New York Bay. Id. Gerbino also stated that he
no longer walked, watched birds or ate fish from the area due to the poor condition
of the water. Id.
25 Id. at 1083.
26 Id. at 1082-83. Judge Ackerman focused his discussion primarily on two prior
New Jersey district court decisions. First, citing Student Public Interest Research
Group v. AT&T Bell Laboratories, 617 F. Supp. 1190 (D.N.J. 1985), the judge
noted that if specific causation were required, enforcement suits would not be instituted unless all polluters discharging into a waterway were joined. PIRG I, 627 F.
Supp. at 1082-83. Furthermore,Judge Ackerman agreed with the position ofJudge
Brotman in Student Public Interest Research Group v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 615
F. Supp. 1419 (D.NJ. 1985), that to require plaintiffs to present a showing of pollution beyond the mere establishment of permit violations would be to "apply a
stricter test for standing than for liability itself." Id. (quoting Georgia-PacificCorp.,
615 F. Supp. at 1424).
27 Id. at 1083. Judge Ackerman observed that Congress intended the statutory
sanctions under the FWPCA to provide redress for plaintiffs as well as to deter
violators. Id. The concept of deterrence includes both specific deterrence, which is
to persuade the violator to halt the pollution, and general deterrence, which is to
persuade other polluters to take precautions against noncompliance with the law.
Id. (citing Student Pub. Interest Research Group v. AT&T Bell Laboratories, 617 F.
Supp. 1190, 1201 (D.N.J. 1985)).

132

SETON HALL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 22:127

Finding that PIRG had overcome all procedural hurdles,2 8
the district court held a bench trial on the liability issue and
granted PIRG's summary judgment motion. 29 Both parties appealed the district court ruling. 30 Subsequently, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit addressed numerous issues, including whether individual PIRG members had
standing that would allow PIRG to assert the members' rights on
a representational basis. 3 '
The Third Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling on
standing. 32 The court of appeals held that citizen environmental
groups, whose members suffered injuries resulting from the defendant's pollution, had standing to bring suit on behalf of its
members under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
(FWPCA).
In 1970, the United States Supreme Court began to mold
the modern approach to standing in Association of Data Processing
28 Id. at 1090. After determining that PIRG had standing, the court addressed
PDT's challenge that the suit was barred by a three year federal statute of limitations provision applicable to citizen's suits. Id. at 1083-85. The court held that a
citizen's suit was not barred by the statute of limitations because of the federal
policy goals behind the FWPCA. Id. at 1084. Judge Ackerman was not willing to
render an FWPCA suit ineffective merely because citizens, rather than the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), initiated suit. Id. The judge concluded that because Congress intended citizens to be able to substitute for the EPA if it failed to
carry out its enforcement responsibilities, the federal statute of limitations would
not apply. Id.
29 Id. at 1090. The court imputed a standard of strict liability to the FWPCA and
found that because defendant PDT failed to comply with its permits, summary
judgment in favor of the plaintiffs was proper regardless of any good faith effort or
intent by PDT to abide by the stipulations of the permit. Id.
30 Public Interest Research Group of New Jersey, Inc., v. Powell Duffryn Terminals Inc., 913 F.2d 64, 68 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1018 (1991).
31 Id. at 70.
32 Id. at 73.
33 Id. The FWPCA was designed to "restore and maintain the chemical, physical
and biological integrity of the Nation's waters . . ." by eradicating the emission of
pollutants into navigable waters. 33 U.S.C. § 125 1(a)(1) (1988). In furtherance of
this objective, FWPCA translates this prohibition of unauthorized pollutant discharge into specific requirements for individual dischargers. Id. at § 1311 (a). Pollutant discharges must be carried out within the parameters set by the NPDES
permit issued to the discharger. Id. at § 1341(a)(l). Discharges made in compliance with the NPDES permit are considered lawful. Id. at § 1342(k). To facilitate
permit enforcement, the FWPCA requires permitees to maintain equipment
designed to monitor the content of the effluent of the permitees. Id. at
§ 1318(a)(4)(A). Monitoring results must be reported to the EPA via discharge
monitoring reports (DMRs) which readily identify noncomplying discharges. 40
C.F.R. §§ 122.4(j), 122.48 (1989). Permit violators may be prosecuted by the EPA
for discharging in violation of permit parameters or citizen enforcement actions
may be instituted by persons harmed by the violations. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (1988).

1991]

NOTE

Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp34 by requiring a plaintiff to establish that he had suffered an injury in fact.35 In Camp, the plaintiff association challenged a ruling by the Comptroller of the
Currency (Comptroller) which increased competition between
national banks and the plaintiff by allowing the banks to provide
data processing services. 36 Writing for the court, Justice Douglas
rejected the traditional standing test which required a party to
prove that his legal rights were invaded. 7 The Justice emphasized that the standing issue was separate and distinct from the
merits of the case, and thus criticized the "legal interest" standing test because it required consideration of the merits.3 8
Alternatively, Justice Douglas asserted that the more appropriate inquiry determined whether the plaintiff alleged an injury
in fact.39 The Court stated that the potential loss of future profits
was a definite economic harm and, therefore, satisfied the injury
in fact requirement.4 ° Justice Douglas concluded that the plaintiff association had article III standing to sue the Comptroller.4 '
397 U.S. 150 (1970).
Id. at 152.
Id. at 151.
Id. at 153. The Court explained that, under the legal interest test, standing is
nonexistent "unless the right invaded is a legal right, - one of property, one arising out of contract, one protected against tortious invasion, or one founded on a
statute which confers a privilege." Id. (quoting Tennessee Power Co. v. TVA, 306
U.S. 118, 137-38 (1939)).
38 Id. See also Flast v. Cohen 392 U.S. 83, 99 (1968) ("standing ... focuses on
the party seeking to get his complaint before a federal court and not on the issues
he wishes to have adjudicated").
39 Assciation of Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 152. The Court indicated that the injury in fact requirement originated in the article III case or controversy limitation.
Id. at 151-52. See also L. TRIBE, supra note 2, at 99 ("As applied in the federal
courts, the core of standing is the requirement of 'injury in fact' to the claimant,
which generally . . . is conceived as an application of Article III's 'case or controversy' requirement") (citations omitted). By restricting courts to address actual disputes, the judiciary is prevented from addressing abstract questions and creating a
government by the judiciary. See Comment, supra note 2, at 139.
40 Association of Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 152. The significance of the Court's
injury in fact test is illustrated by the district court's observations regarding the
"long and well established line of judicial authority holding that plaintiffs whose
only injury is loss due to competition lack standing to maintain legal action to redress their economic injury." Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 279 F. Supp. 675, 678 (D. Minn. 1968).
Implicit in the Court's holding was the possibility that potential injuries would
sufficiently fulfill the injury in fact requirement. See Association of Data Processing, 397
U.S. at 152.
41 Id. at 158. The Court's analysis did not terminate, however, upon a finding of
an injury-in-fact. The Supreme Court continued its analysis by considering
whether its review was proper in light of certain prudential considerations. Id. at
153. The particular prudential consideration set forth in this landmark decision
34
35
36
37
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In dicta, Justice Douglas posited that injury in fact was not limited to economic injury but42 also included aesthetic, conservational or recreational harm.
It was not until the 1972 decision in Sierra Club v. Morton,4 3
however, that the Supreme Court affirmatively addressed
whether the injury in fact requirement was satisfied by a non-economic injury.4 4 In Sierra Club, the plaintiff, relying on Section 10
of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), sought to enjoin the
proposed development of a national game refuge known as the
Mineral King Valley located in the Sierra Nevada Mountains.4 5
Justice Stewart, writing for the majority, concluded that Sierra
Club lacked standing because it failed to prove that its members
were adversely affected by the challenged action.4 6 Justice Stewwas whether the "interest sought to be protected by the complainant [was] arguably
within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question." Id. (emphasis added).
42 Id. at 154.
43 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
44 Id. at 734. Sierra Club intended this litigation to be a test case for standing.
Id. at 736 n.8. Therefore, it refused to assert its members' interests in the use and
enjoyment of the affected area as a basis for standing. Id. Relying on the Second
Circuit opinion in Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608
(2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966) (which allowed a special interest to
support standing), the Sierra Club alleged a "special interest in the conservation
and the sound maintenance of the national parks, game refuges, and forests of the
country... " Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 736 n.8.
45 Id. at 730, 732. The grant of standing contained in § 10 of the Administrative
Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1971), provides that "a person suffering legal
wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action, within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof."
Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 732-33.
46 Id. at 741. The Court noted that plaintiffs only alleged a general interest in
the conservation of the environmentally threatened valley, rather than alleging that
it or its members would be affected in their activities in the park. Id. at 735. The
Court, quoting the full text of the complaint filed by Sierra Club, pointed out that
the only language referring to Sierra Club's interest in the Disney development was
its "special interest in the conservation and the sound maintenance of the national
parks, game refuges and forests of the country" and in the "protect[ion] and conserv[ation of] the national resources of the Sierra Nevada Mountains." Id. at 735
n.8. The Court noted that this interest was insufficient to establish standing because general interest in a problem is not the same as being "adversely affected" or
"aggrieved" so as to warrant standing. Id. at 739. The Court recognized Sierra
Club's longstanding commitment toward the preservation of the environment, but
declared this dedication to be irrelevant in the context of standing to sue. See id.
The Court cautioned that if it were to allow such suits by organizations with a mere
"special interest," there would never be a basis upon which to deny standing to
these groups. Id. If the groups are granted standing, the Court continued, then
individuals would also be entitled to bring these types of suits. Id. at 739-40. The
Court concluded that such an expansion of standing doctrine would undermine the
goal of standing by "authoriz[ing] judicial review at the behest of organizations or
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art stressed that a plaintiff must demonstrate an actual or
threatened harm to his use of the affected area47 and that the
assertion of a generalized interest to advance personal values inadequately fulfilled article III objectives.48 The Court examined
Sierra Club's allegations and determined that no club members
were personally affected by the defendant's game refuge.4 9
Despite ultimately holding that the plaintiffs did not have
standing, the Court clearly broadened the scope of injury sufficient to confer standing by affirming that harm to aesthetic or
recreational interests may adequately establish an injury in fact. 50
Recognizing the social import of aesthetics and recreation, the
Justice affirmed that claims alleging environmental injury are justiciable. 5 Furthermore, Justice Stewart denounced the notion
individuals who seek to do no more than vindicate their own value preferences
through the judicial process." Id. at 740 (footnote omitted).
47 Id. at 734-35. The Court interpreted injury in fact to mean an effect on one's
use of an area. See Sax, Standing to Sue: A CriticalReview of the Mineral King Decision, 13
NAT. RESOURCESJ. 76, 77 (1973) (citing Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 735
n.8 (1972)). The merger of "injury in fact" with the distinct concept of "use" suggests that the Sierra Club Court did not view standing to be as liberal as suggested
by others. See id. at 77 n.14.
48 405 U.S. at 739. Although the Sierra Club holding limited standing to persons
alleging an actual use and injury, the ruling did not effectively limit citizen suits
because it simply expanded pleading requirements. See Scott, supra note 7, at 667;
Sax, supra note 47, at 76.
49 405 U.S. 727, 735 (1972). In a separate dissent,Justice Douglas opined that
standing to litigate environmental issues should be directly conferred on the objects potentially affected by the challenged action. Id. at 741-42 (Douglas, J., dissenting). As ships and corporations may sue through fictitious legal personalities,
Justice Douglas analogized that forests, trees and streams should have standing to
challenge actions that will ultimately result in their destruction. Id. at 742-43
(Douglas, J., dissenting). Justice Douglas continued that those persons intimately
related to the threatened objects are entitled to act as representatives. Id. at 745
(Douglas, J., dissenting). Therefore, the Justice concluded that Sierra Club, as an
entity composed of persons who utilize the affected geography, had standing to
defend the threatened land on behalf of the park's natural resources. Id. at 752
(Douglas, J., dissenting).
50 Id. at 734. The Court noted the distinction between expanding the number of
categories in which an injury in fact will be found and abandoning the injury in fact
element altogether by allowing parties without any real interest to raise a claim. Id.
at 738. See also Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 39 (1976).
51 Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 734. For support, the Court cited numerous lower
court decisions where a non-economic injury was found to be sufficient to constitute an injury in fact. Id. at 738 n.13 (citing Envtl. Defense Fund v. Hardin, 428
F.2d 1093 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (interest in effects of pesticide sufficient to confer standing); Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994
(D.C. Cir. 1966) (standing established through plaintiff's interest in television programming); Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir.
1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966) (interest in effects of hydroelectric plant
sufficient to support standing); Reade v. Ewing, 205 F.2d 630 (2d Cir. 1953) (stand-
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that widely shared interests are insufficient to establish standing.12 Thus, while endorsing the injury in fact requirement, the
Sierra Club Court significantly eased the burden of establishing
the requisite harm.53
One year later, in United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures(SCRAP),5 4 the Court continued to refine the
parameters of the injury in fact requirement. 55 In SCRAP, a student environmental group (SCRAP) challenged the Interstate
Commerce Commission's refusal to suspend railroad rate
surcharges.5 6 SCRAP asserted that the proposed rate structure
would unnecessarily increase raw timber use by impeding the
utilization of recyclable materials.5 7 SCRAP additionally claimed
that it was injured by the increased costs of finished products and
increased taxes caused by the continued disposal of non-recyclable goods.5 8 Furthermore, SCRAP advanced that its use of the
ing established by plaintiff's interest in labeling of oleo margarine); Crowther v.
Seaborg, 312 F. Supp. 1205 (D. Col. 1970) (interest in atomic blasting sufficient to
support standing)).
52 Id.
53 See Scott, supra note 7, at 667 ("the more lasting import of the [Sierra Club]
decision may be its explicit affirmation, if not holding, that harm of a non-economic
nature to an individual may constitute injury in fact for standing purposes").
54 412 U.S. 669 (1973).
55 Id. at 686-90.
56 Id. at 675-76. A railroad seeking a rate increase must provide thirty days notice to the Interstate Commerce Commission ("ICC") prior to effectuating the rate
change. Id. at 672 n.1 (citation omitted). The ICC may suspend the proposed increase for seven months if an investigation into the lawfulness of the proposed rate
structure is deemed to be appropriate. Id. at 673 n.2 (citation omitted). At the
expiration of the investigatory period, the rate becomes effective unless an invalidating reason is discovered. Id. at 673-74. Pursuant to this scheme, many of the
nation's railroads sought to institute a 2.5% freight rate increase on five days notice. Id. at 674. The ICC denied the request, instructing the railroads to refile the
proposal with a 30 day notice. Id. at 675. Upon refiling of the surcharge, SCRAP
requested that the ICC suspend the rate increase for the permitted time period. Id.
57 Id. at 676. SCRAP alleged these injuries to the ICC in support of its request
to suspend the tariff. Id. The ICC found that "'the involved general increase will
have no significant adverse effect on the movement of traffic by railway or on the
quality of the human environment .... '" Id. at 677.
58 Id. at 678. The primary argument set forth in SCRAP's complaint alleged that
the proposed surcharge was unconstitutional due to the ICC's failure to file an environmental impact statement as required by the National Environmental Policy Act
of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1982) (NEPA). Id. at 679. NEPA provides in pertinent
part that:
The Congress authorizes and directs that, to the fullest extent possible: (1) the policies, regulations, and public laws of the United States
shall be interpreted and administered in accordance with the policies
set forth in this chapter, and (2) all agencies of the Federal Government shall-
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surrounding land was threatened by the unneeded harvesting of
raw materials.59
Writing for the majority, Justice Stewart asserted that these
injuries sufficiently established an injury in fact. 60 The Justice ac-

knowledged that, even though all persons using a parcel of land
suffer identical harm, a plaintiff's individual losses constitute an
injury in fact. 6' Despite conceding that all persons who breathed
the valley air could allege similar harm,62 Justice Stewart posited
that the harm's widespread nature did not defeat the individual
standing when the plaintiffs alleged a specific injury resulting
from the defendant's conduct. 63 Accordingly, Justice Stewart
maintained that the degree of injury is irrelevant.64 The Justice
(C) include in every recommendation or report on proposals
for legislation and other major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment, a
detailed statement by the responsible official on (i) the environmental impact of the proposed action,
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be
avoided should the proposal be implemented,
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action,
(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of
man's environment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity, and
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of
resources which would be involved in the proposed
action should it be implemented.
NEPA, § 102, 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1982).
59 SCRAP, 412 U.S. at 685.
60 Id. at 685-87.
61 Id. at 686-87. The Court distinguished the facts of the instant case from those
present in Sierra Club. See id. at 687. The Court noted that the alleged harm in Sierra
Club occurred in a limited geographic region. Id. In the instant case, however,
substantially all of the country's railroads requested a rate increase which, as plaintiffs assert, adversely impacted the nation's resources. Id.
These cases clearly demonstrate the impact of pleading a perceptible harm.
Despite the existence of a distinct injury to a limited number of persons and an
explicit causal relationship, the Sierra Club Court denied standing. Sierra Club v.
Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 735 (1972). The SCRAP Court, however, granted standing to
plaintiffs despite the tenuous causation and widespread injury. SCRAP, 412 U.S. at
688.
62
63

Id. at 687.

Id. The Court explained that widespread harm cannot defeat standing since
the most injurious governmental actions would then go unchallenged. Id. at 688.
64 Id. at 689 n.14 (citing Davis, Standing: Taxpayers and Others, 35 U. CHI. L. REV.
601, 613 (1968)). The Court noted with approval the premise of Professor Davis
that:
[t]he basic idea that comes out in numerous cases is that an identifiable trifle is enough for standing to fight out a question of principle;
the trifle is the basis for standing and the principle supplies the
motivation.
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explained that any identifiable injury will confer standing once a
party has been adversely affected. 65 Thus, the Court held that
SCRAP satisfied the article III injury in fact requirement.66
In a subsequent effort to limit judicial access, the Court, in
Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization,6 7 required an
explicit causal relationship between the alleged harm and the defendant's conduct and also defined a harm redressible by a
favorable court ruling. 68 In Simon, indigent plaintiffs challenged
an Internal Revenue Service (IRS) ruling which accorded
favorable tax status to several hospitals, despite the hospitals'
failure to provide medical services to indigent patients. 69 PlainId. (citing Davis, Standing: Taxpayers and Others, 35 U. CHI. L. REV. 601, 613 (1968)).
65 Id. Justice Stewart noted that adversely affected litigants have been provided
judicial recourse even when their stake in the resolution was nominal. Id. See Baker
v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (fraction of a vote at stake); McGowan v. Maryland,
366 U.S. 420 (1961) ($5 fine at stake); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S.
663 (1966) (a $1.50 poll tax at stake).
66 The Court briefly discussed causation, the second prong of the standing analysis. SCRAP, 412 U.S. at 688-89. Justice Stewart recognized that because the injury was "far less direct and perceptible" than the injury in Sierra Club, the causation
issue remained questionable. Id. at 688. The Court stated that the pleading of any
perceptible harm sufficiently confers standing. Id. The Court stressed that the
probability of proof at trial is not to be considered in determining whether standing
exists. Id. The plaintiff need only allege, not prove, that he has been harmed by an
action. Id. The Court cautioned, however, that "pleadings must be something
more than an ingenious exercise in the conceivable." Id. It is the responsibility of
the defendant, the Court maintained, to establish the falsity of any allegations and
request summary judgment if appropriate. Id. at 689. Although defendants have
occasionally attempted to disprove plaintiff's allegations such attempts have generally been unsuccessful. See, Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 878 F.2d 422 (D.C. Cir.
1989).
67 426 U.S. 26 (1976).
68 See id. at 38 (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975)). In Warth, Justice
Powell denied standing to a plaintiff group challenging the constitutionality of zoning ordinances which allegedly excluded low to moderate income families. Warth,
422 U.S. at 502. The Court required plaintiffs to allege facts establishing that, without the restrictive zoning regulations, there existed a "substantial probability" that
plaintiffs would have the ability to purchase real estate in the town. Id. at 504. The
Court additionally required the plaintiffs to allege facts establishing that the relief
requested would enable the plaintiffs to purchase the desired realty. Id. The Court
found plaintiffs' allegations that the restrictive ordinances prevented third party
builders from constructing low to moderate income housing in the area insufficient
to establish causation. Id. at 505-06. No facts established that, but for the exclusionary zoning ordinances, the construction of affordable housing would have occurred
or that petitioners would have been able to afford housing. Id. at 506-07. The petitioners' ability to purchase realty in the town depended on the builders' willingness
to construct the requisite housing. Id. The relief requested, therefore, would not
necessarily enable plaintiffs to purchase or rent realty in the desired area. Id. at 507.
See also Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614 (1973) (standing denied where the
requested remedy would not necessarily alleviate the harm alleged).
69 Simon, 426 U.S. at 31. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) claimed that the
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tiffs argued that the IRS ruling encouraged hospitals to deny
services to indigent persons.7 °
The United States Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs
lacked standing because the deprivation of services was not fairly
traceable to the IRS and it was speculative whether a favorable
court decision would redress that harm. 7 ' Emphasizing that no
hospital was a named defendant, the Court determined that the
alleged harm could have resulted from independent hospital decisions.72 Moreover, Justice Powell advanced that it was purely
speculative whether the Court's remedial powers would redress
the alleged harm by providing the desired medical services. 73
Recognizing that hospitals apparently preferred to forego
favorable tax status rather than render free services, the Court
questioned whether a ruling for the plaintiffs would secure the
desired remedy." Adding these two elements to the article III
standing test, the Court increased the plaintiff's burden in accessing a legal forum.75
provision of medical services qualified as charitable when such provisions benefitted the community as a whole. -Id. at 31 n.5. Therefore, the IRS argued, a hospital
is entitled to charitable tax status simply by furnishing medical services to a sufficiently large class of persons, despite the fact that indigent care is not provided. Id.
70 Id. at 33.
71 Id. at 42-43.
72 Id. at 41-43. The Justice explained that article III prevents courts from addressing injuries that are caused by the actions of third parties not before the
Court. Id. at 41-42. The Court opined that the injuries alleged by the plaintiffs
may have been caused by hospitals that were not parties in the litigation. Id. at 42.
73 Id. The Court observed that allegations involving indirect injury create difficulties in establishing the traceability and redressibility prongs of article III standing analysis. Id. at 44-45. But see Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group,
Inc., 438 U.S. 59 (1977) (standing granted where alleged injury of thermal pollution indirectly resulted from legislation limiting liability in event of nuclear accident). Distinguishing SCRAP, the Court stated that despite an indirect.injury with a
tenuous causal relationship, a "specific and perceptible harm" was alleged. Simon,
426 U.S. at 45 n.25 (citing United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 688-89 (1973)).
In Simon, the plaintiffs failed to establish a sufficient causal connection between the
injury and the challenged conduct due to the speculative inferences necessary to
connect the injury to the challenged conduct. Id. at 45.
74 Id. at 43.
75 See id. at 44-45 (citing Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 505 (1975)). The Simon
opinion reflects the Court's preoccupation with specificity in pleadings. See Nichol,
supra n.9, at 196 (contrary to applicable pleading rules which generally allow the
benefit of any inferences contained in the complaint, the Simon Court viewed pleadings critically by requiring detailed allegations). Compare Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S.
490 (1975) (standing denied where plaintiffs failed to show that remedy would alleviate the alleged harm) with Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp.,
429 U.S. 252 (1977) (standing granted where plaintiff specifically alleged that zoning prevented a particular builder from constructing a planned project). But see
Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91 (1979) (standing granted to
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In 1978, however, the Supreme Court lessened the strict
causation standard and granted standing to a plaintiff who could
only establish an indirect injury. 76 In Duke Power Company v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, a plaintiff environmental group
(CESG) challenged the constitutionality of the Price-Anderson
Act (Act) which limited nuclear plant operator liability in the
event of a nuclear accident.77 Chief Justice Burger, writing for
the majority, required the plaintiffs to demonstrate a "distinct
and palpable injury" that was fairly traceable to the defendant's
actions. 78 The Chief Justice concluded that CESG's injuries,
which consisted of thermal pollution and emission of non-natural
radiation, sufficiently established standing.79
Addressing the causation prong, Chief Justice Burger posited that article III required a "substantial likelihood" that the
requested relief would alleviate the alleged harm.80 The Chief
Justice observed that "but for" the Act's limited liability guarantee, there was a substantial likelihood that the nuclear plant
would not have been constructed. 8 ' Thus, the Duke Court's liberalized application of standing in environmental litigation allowed
challenge racial steering despite a failure to show any specific events of the alleged
discriminatory practice).
76 See Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59 (1978)
(standing proper where "substantial likelihood" existed that defendant's actions
caused plaintiff's injuries).
77 Id. at 67. Enacted in 1957, the Price-Anderson Act (Act) was aimed at "protect[ing] the public and . . . encourag[ing] the development of the atomic energy
industry" by limiting the liability for a nuclear accident to $500 million plus the
available private liability insurance. Id. at 64-65 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2012
(i)(1988)). Under its present enactment, liability from a single nuclear accident is
limited to $560 million, allocated between private insurers, contributions from the
licensees operating nuclear plants and the federal government. Id. at 67.
Plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of the Act on the grounds that it constituted arbitrary governmental action in violation of the due process clause of the
fifth amendment. Id. at 69. Plaintiffs also alleged that, in the event of a nuclear
accident, the Act's limitation of liability would functionally result in the taking of
the plaintiffs' property without just compensation in violation of the fifth amendment takings clause. Id.
78 Id. at 72 (citing Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975); Arlington Heights
v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 261 (1977)).
79 Id. at 73-74, 77. Interestingly, the Court reasoned that generalized concern
and uncertainty concerning the effects of radiation constituted a sufficient injury.
Id. at 74. The Court thus found that the emission of non-natural radiation was a
sufficient injury in fact to support standing. Id. at 73-74.
80 Id. at 75 n.20. But see Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26
(1976) (indirect injury creates substantial article III difficulties regarding traceability and redressibility).
81 Id. at 77. The Court considered testimony presented at the Joint Committee
on Atomic Energy in 1956 which addressed the necessity for limited liability. Id. at
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an indirect injury to satisfy the "traceable" and "redressible"
requirements.8 2
The three prong article III standing test was explicitly pronounced by the United States Supreme Court in its 1981 decision, Valley Forge ChristianCollege v. Americans Unitedfor Separationof
Church and State."3 In Valley Forge, plaintiffs alleged that the conveyance of federally owned land to Valley Forge Christian College (VFCC) used tax dollars for religious purposes in violation
of the first amendment establishment clause.8 4 Writing for the
majority, Justice Rehnquist acknowledged that the Court's prior
standing decisions lacked definition.85 Therefore, the Justice
succinctly delineated the minimum requirements for invoking the
Court's jurisdiction.86 Justice Rehnquist summarized that a
plaintiff must have experienced an actual or threatened injury
traceable to the defendant's conduct 7 and capable of judicial redress.88 Applying this test, Justice Rehnquist concluded that the
plaintiffs lacked standing because they failed to allege a specific
harm resulting from the challenged action.8 9
75. Industry spokesmen expressed a "categorical unwillingness" to produce nuclear power without such a limitation. Id. (citation omitted).
Chief Justice Burger additionally rejected any mandate requiring plaintiffs to
establish a nexus between the alleged injuries and the constitutional challenge to
the Act. Id. at 78. The requirement that plaintiffs show such a connection stems
from Flast v. Cohen, 302 U.S. 83 (1968), which addressed taxpayer standing. Id.
This requirement, however, has never been extended to suits outside the area of
taxpayer challenges. Id. at 78-79 (citing Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop
the War, 418 U.S. 208, 225 n.15 (1974)).
82 Comment, supra note 2, at 147.
83 454 U.S. 464 (1982).
84 Id. at 469. Pursuant to the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act
of 1949, designed to allow disposition of surplus property, the Department of
Health, Education and Welfare gifted the property to Valley Forge Christian College. Id. at 466-68. The property was appraised at $577,500. Id. at 468.
85 Id.; see also supra note 9.
86 Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 472.
87 Id. (citing Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99 (1979)).
88 Id. (citing Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38, 41
(1976)).
89 Id. at 485-86. Justice Rehnquist also denied standing to the plaintiffs as taxpayers. Id. at 482. The Court explained that, under Flast v. Cohen, taxpayers are
required to establish standing by challenging the constitutionality of a congressional act under the taxing and spending clause. Id. at 479 (citing Flast v. Cohen,
392 U.S. 83, 102-03 (1968)). Additionally, the Court noted that taxpayers must
show that the challenged action is beyond the power granted by the taxing and
spending clause. Id. (citing Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 102-03 (1968)). Justice
Rehnquist reminded that, in Valley Forge, plaintiffs' complaint did not challenge the
taxing and spending power, but rather alleged unconstitutional use of their tax dollars. Id. at 476. Based on this reasoning, the Court denied standing to plaintiffs as
taxpayers. Id. at 482.
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Explaining the policy purposes of the tripartite standing test,
Justice Rehnquist initially pointed out that standing issues should
be resolved within their factual contexts to avoid an unbridled
development of precedent. 90 Second, Justice Rehnquist advanced that an injury in fact guarantees that courts will not be
exploited by concerned bystanders who wish to assert personal
interests. 9 ' Rather, Justice Rehnquist stated that the courts must
protect those individuals most likely to be affected by the decision. 92 Finally, the Court acknowledged that standing requireaddressing abstract questions
ments prevent the judiciary from 93
and usurping legislative authority.
It was against this historical context that the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit clarified the article III environmental standing test in Public Interest Research Group of New
Jersey, Inc. v. Powell Duffryn Terminals Inc.94 The court of appeals
required plaintiffs to show an actual injury which was fairly traceable to the defendant's conduct and was redressible by judicial
ruling.9 5
The court initially addressed whether the plaintiffs had sufficiently established an injury in fact. 96 The court recognized that
standing can be established through an injury to one's aesthetic
90 Id. at 472. The Court specifically noted:

Because it assures an actual factual setting in which the litigant asserts
a claim of injury in fact, a court may decide the case with some confidence that its decision will not pave the way for lawsuits which have
some, but not all, of the facts of the case actually decided by the court.
Id.
91 Id. at 473 (citing United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 687 (1973)).
92 Id. The Court added that:
The exercise of judicial power, which can so profoundly affect the
lives, liberty and property of those to whom it extends, is therefore
restricted to litigants who can show "injury in fact" resulting from the
action which they seek to have the court adjudicate.
Id.
93 Id. at 474 (citing Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 279 (1919)).
94 913 F.2d 64 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1018 (1991). In applying
the Valley Forge standing test, the PIRG court provided much needed guidance regarding the test's causation tier. Id. at 72 n.6 (citation omitted). The Valley Forge
Court, which concluded that the plaintiffs failed to assert a sufficient injury in fact to
confer standing, never reached the causation issue. See id. (citing Valley Forge, 454
U.S. at 485-86). Furthermore, prior application of the causation requirement provided little guidance. See Varat, VariableJusticiabilityand the Duke Power Case, 58 TEx.
L. REV. 273, 287 (1980).

95 PIRG, 913 F.2d at 72. The court pointed out that it was not necessary to
consider traditional prudential limitations which frequently result in the denial of
standing since FWPCA specifically accords standing to the extent of the Constitution. Id. at 70 n.3. See supra note 5.
96 PIRG, 913 F.2d at 71.
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or recreational enjoyment of a natural resource.97 The court observed that several PIRG members who previously recreated
along the Kill Van Kull shores or in the adjacent park discontinued their activities because of the Kill's diminished condition.98
Consequently, the court recognized that the injury in fact requirement was satisfied. 99
The court of appeals next discussed whether the harm to
PIRG's members was fairly traceable to or caused by the defendant's alleged violations. 100 Rejecting the district court's reasoning that a permit violation adequately linked the alleged harm to
PDT's unlawful action,' 0 ' the appeals court held that a closer
causal relationship was necessary to satisfy the second prong of
the article III test. 102
Despite applying a different test, the court held that the
plaintiffs established the requisite causal connection.' 0 3 The
panel asserted that the plaintiffs must show a substantial likelihood existed that the alleged harm resulted from defendant's
conduct.'0 4 Recognizing that numerous polluters may contribute
to a waterway's diminished condition,' ° the court of appeals did
not require PIRG to show that PDT singularly caused the plaintiffs' injury.' 0 6 Rather, the court explained that the substantial
likelihood prong may be established by showing that the defendant discharged a pollutant exceeding the permitted limits into
the waterway which adversely affected and contributed to the
97 Id. (citing Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 735 (1972); United States v.
SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 689 n. 14 (1973)). The court acknowledged that even a nominal injury was constitutionally significant. Id.
98 PIRG, 913 F.2d at 71. See supra note 24.
99 PIRG, 913 F.2d at 71. The court of appeals, recognizing that any identifiable
injury is sufficient to confer standing, stated that the interference with plaintiffs' use
and enjoyment of the Kill was significant. Id.
100 Id. at 71-73.
101 Id. at 72.

102

103

Id.
Id.

104 Id. (citing Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59,
75 n.20 (1978)). The court explained that the presence of a substantial likelihood
that defendant's conduct caused plaintiffs' harm ensures that the plaintiffs are not
simply concerned bystanders, as article III prohibits. Id..

105

Id. at 72 n.8.

Id. at 72. The court added that plaintiffs are similarly not required to sue
every discharger polluting the waterway. Id. at 72 n.8. Moreover, the court opined
that standing is sufficiently established by showing that the named polluter contributed to the harm alleged. Id. The court reminded that the degree of actual harm
caused by the polluter is irrelevant to the threshold determination of standing. Id.
(citing United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 689 n.14 (1973)).
106
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The court of appeals then examined PIRG's alleged injury to
determine whether it was caused, at least in part, by PDT's emissions.'O The court noted that the reports PDT filed with the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) evidenced grease and oil
discharge violations.' 0 9 Considering testimony regarding an oily

sheen on the Kill, the court concluded that PIRG sufficiently established a causal relationship between the alleged harm and
PDT's illegal discharges.1 0
To complete the standing analysis, the court of appeals concluded that PIRG also satisfied the final prong of the standing
test" 1' by establishing that a favorable decision would remedy the
alleged injury. 1 2 Acknowledging the FWPCA's underlying statutory objective," 13 the court of appeals stated that injunctive relief
would remedy PIRG's injuries by ensuring the cessation of illegal
discharges.' "4 The court additionally observed that the deterrent
effect of the civil penalties assessed against PDT would advance
the public interest.' ' Finding that a favorable decision would
16
redress PIRG's injuries, the court granted standing."
107

Id. at 72.

108 Id. at 72-73.
109 Id. at 73. See supra notes 12, 21. The court of appeals noted that plaintiffs are

not required to show to a "scientific certainty" that PDT discharged the oil which
injured plaintiffs. PIRG, 913 F.2d at 73 n.10. The court emphasized that article III
does not require "tort-like causation." Id. Instead, the court asserted that PDT may
negate these allegations by showing that it did not violate its oil and grease permit
limitations or by showing that plaintiffs allegations are untrue. Id. (citing United
States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 689 (1973)).
11o Id.
'''
Id. at 73.
112 Id.
113 See supra note 33.
114 PIRG, 913 F.2d at 73. The court added that plaintiffs are not required to show
that the favorable decision will return the Kill to a pristine condition. d. Instead,
the court explained that plaintiffs are only required to show that their injuries are
likely to be redressed by a favorable decision. Id. (citing Valley Forge Christian
College v. Americans United for Separation of Church & State, 454 U.S. 464, 472
(1982)).
115 Id.
116 Id. After finding that PIRG's members had standing and, therefore, PIRG had
standing on a representational basis, the court considered whether a five year statute of limitations applied to citizen suits instituted under the FWPCA. Id. at 73-76.
The Third Circuit recognized that enforcement actions instituted by the EPA must
be commenced within five years of the violation and, thus, that citizen suits, as supplemental aids to EPA enforcement, must function under the same procedural constraints. See id. at 74. See also Sierra Club v. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., 834 F.2d 1517,
1522-23 (9th Cir. 1987) (federal statute of limitations applicable when citizens
stand "in the shoes" of the EPA); Public Interest Research Group of New Jersey,

1991]

NOTE

145

In a lengthy concurring opinion, Judge Aldisert expressed
Inc. v. Witco Chemical Corp., 1990 WL 66178 (D.N.J. May 17, 1990) (federal five
year statute of limitations applicable to citizen enforcement of FWPCA); At. States
Legal Found. v. Al Tech Specialty Steel Corp., 635 F. Supp. 284, 287 (N.D.N.Y.
1986) (five year statute of limitations applied to citizen enforcement suit brought
under FWPCA); Connecticut Fund for the Env't. v. Job Plating Co., 623 F. Supp.
207, 213 (D. Conn. 1985) (Federal statute of limitations applies to citizen FWPCA
suits). But see Pub. Interest Research Group of New Jersey, Inc. v. United States
Metals Refining Co., 681 F. Supp. 237, 239 (D.N.J. 1987) (no statute of limitations
applies to FWPCA citizen suits); Student Pub. Interest Group of NewJersey, Inc. v.
AT&T Bell Laboratories, 617 F. Supp. 1190, 1202 (D.N.J. 1985) (no statute of limitations applies to citizen enforcement suits instituted under FWPCA); Student Pub.
Interest Research Group of New Jersey, Inc. v. Tenneco Polymers, 602 F. Supp.
1394, 1398-99 (D.N.J. 1985) (state statute of limitations does not apply to citizen
suits brought under the FWPCA).
Furthermore, the court of appeals held that the statute of limitations did not
commence running until DMRs have been filed with the EPA and the statutory sixty
day notice period has expired. PIRG, 913 F.2d at 75. This notice period must be
provided to the EPA in order to allow it to decide whether to commence the enforcement action or allow plaintiff citizens to proceed. Id. The imposition of the five
year statute of limitations ultimately barred twelve of the alleged violations. Id. at
76 n.17.
The court of appeals proceeded to the merits of the issue and granted plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment. Id. at 76-79. The court first determined that
the single operational upset (SOU) defense asserted by PDT did not create a defense to liability but rather related to the calculation of penalties. Id. at 76. The
court observed that the SOU defense was set out in FWPCA subsections addressing
the calculation of penalties and was expressly limited to those subsections. Id. The
court of appeals interpreted the term "upset" to mean "unusual or extraordinary
occurrence" or a "non-routine malfunctioning at an otherwise generally compliant
facility." Id. at 77 (citing EPA Guidance Interpreting "Single Operational Upset,"
Addendum B to Brief of Intervenor EPA). The court further acknowledged that
PDT was unable to avail itself of the SOU defense since no evidence illustrated that
PDT had been operating under extraordinary circumstances. Id. The court of appeals refused to accept PDT's argument that it had operated in a state of continual
upset for a period of six years. Id. Finding that PDT's violations were a result of
the defendant's recalcitrance, the court concluded that PDT was not entitled to use
the defense and that PIRG was, therefore, entitled to summary disposition. Id. at
79.
Lastly, the court of appeals addressed the assessment of penalties. Id. at 79-8 1.
The court considered the economic benefit resulting from noncompliance. Id. at
79-80. The court rejected PDT's argument that the district court's finding of economic benefit was clearly erroneous. Id. at 80. The court approved the lower
court's reliance on PDT's own cost projections of hauling its waste off-site to determine the economic benefit which PDT enjoyed. d. The court emphasized that reasonable approximation of benefit can be appropriately considered by the court
when assessing penalties, in addition to the seriousness of the violations. Id. at 7980 (citation omitted). The court of appeals additionally upheld the lower court's
findings as to the seriousness of the violations. Id. The finding itself was based on
the number of violations and the degree of the violations which frequently exceeded limitations by 100% to 1000%. Id. at 79. Additionally, the discharges contained toxins extremely harmful to plant and marine life. Id. The court is directed
by the Act to consider numerous factors in determining the appropriate penalty. d.
The Act provides in pertinent part:
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specific concerns that PIRG did not have standing to bring suit
against PDT.' 1 7 Judge Aldisert conceded that PIRG had sufficiently established the injury in fact and redressibility prongs of
the Valley Forge test. ' 18 Judge Aldisert questioned, however,
PIRG's ability to satisfy the causation tier of the article III test." 9
The senior judge found that the plaintiffs' testimony did not
identify any specific harm resulting from PDT's illegal
discharges. 120
Judge Aldisert's concerns stemmed from the Kill Van Kull's
general environmental condition. 12 ' The judge noted that the
Kill's highly industrialized waters were polluted from various
sources, including two large sewage treatment plants and repeated oil spills.122 While the judge acknowledged that PDT was
In determining the amount of civil penalty the court shall consider the
seriousness of the violation or violations, the economic benefit (if any)
resulting from the violations, any history of such violations, any goodfaith efforts to comply with applicable requirements, the economic impact of the penalty on the violation, and other such matters as justice
requires.
Id. (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d)(1988)). The court of appeals, however, rejected the
lower court's penalty reduction based on the EPA's nonfeasance. Id. at 81. The
court of appeals noted that the district court supported this reduction by considering PDT's "good-faith attempts to comply with the Act." Id. at 80 (citing Pub. Int.
Research Group of New Jersey, Inc. v. Powell Duffryn Terminals Inc., 720 F. Supp.
1158, 1166-67 (D.NJ. 1989)). The court of appeals argued that the district court's
basis of good faith directly contradicted the district court's assertion that PDT's
actions did not rise "to the level of good faith." PIRG, 913 F.2d at 81 (citing PIRG
v. Powell Duffryn Terminals Inc., 720 F. Supp. at 1165). Recognizing that no legitimate basis existed to reduce the penalty, the court of appeals declared that the
maximum penalty was appropriate. Id. Finally, the court of appeals ordered PDT to
pay the penalty to the Treasury, rather than establishing a trust fund designed to
protect the environment. Id. at 82. The court noted that payment to the United
States Treasury was consistent with the congressional intent to supplement EPA
enforcement with citizen suits. Id. The court of appeals, while not ruling out the
possibility of a trust fund, emphasized that once the label of penalty is used, the
money must be paid to the Treasury. Id. The court of appeals lastly limited the
lower court's permanent injunction of all future violations to an injunction of all
future violations of the existing permit. Id. at 83.
117 Id. (Aldisert, J., concurring).
118 Id. at 85 (Aldisert, J., concurring). For a discussion of the Valley Forge test, see
supra notes 83-93 and accompanying text.
119 Id. at 85 (Aldisert, J., concurring).
120 Id. at 87 (Aldisert, J., concurring).
121 Id. at 86 (Aldisert, J., concurring). Judge Aldisert stated that "[i]f the receiving waters of Powell Duffryn's discharge were crystal clear waters of a sylvan lake or
an uncontaminated mountain stream, it would be easy to relate the alleged injury
sustained by the member/plaintiffs to the company's discharge." Id. (Aldisert, J.,
concurring).
122 Id. (Aldisert, J., concurring). The Kill Van Kull was characterized by Judge
Aldisert as "one of the most industrialized waterways in the United States, if not the

1991]

NOTE

147

an egregious, habitual polluter of the Kill Van Kull, 2 ' he ob-4
2
served that the once pristine waterway had lost its beauty.'
Thus, the judge posited that it was difficult to establish a sufficient causal relation between PDT's discharges and the Kill's ravaged condition.' 2 5 Judge Aldisert contended that no plaintiff was
able to link a specific injury to any particular PDT conduct. 26
The judge further expressed deep concern that PDT had been
held solely responsible for the destruction of the Kill Van Kull,
while in reality the heavy traffic, chemical facilities and numerous
27
oil spills significantly contributed to the water condition.
Despite his uncertainty, Judge Aldisert concurred with the
world." Id. Thejudge noted that, with the exception of Kill Van Kull Park situated
two miles from PDT, the entire waterway abuts heavily industrialized realty. Id.
123 Id. at 85 (Aldisert, J., concurring). Judge Aldisert proposed that Powell Duffryn deliberately violated its permits because, from a financial standpoint, it was
more profitable to continue to discharge unlawful quantities of effluents into the
water and allow increased profits to absorb the penalties, rather than to operate in
accordance with the permits. Id.
124 Id. at 86 (Aldisert, J., concurring).
125 Id. at 87 (Aldisert,J., concurring). The judge noted that the Kill was the site
of numerous oil spills. Id. at 86 (Aldisert, J., concurring). During January to June
1990, five major oil spills despoiled the water of the Kill. Id. (citing Los Angeles
Times, June 8, 1990, at A3, col. 1). The spill which occurred in June discharged
260,000 gallons of oil into the water. Id. (citing N.Y. Times, June 8, 1990, at A1,
col. 5).
126 Id. at 87 (Aldisert, J., concurring). Plaintiff Cheryl Cummings testified that
her enjoyment of the Kill Van Kull Park was reduced by the condition of the Kill
which she characterized as having "a film ... like a rainbow or sometimes like
greenish-yellow." Id. (Aldisert, J., concurring) (citing Student Pub. Interest Research Group of New Jersey, Inc. v. P.D. Oil and Chemical Storage, Inc., 627 F.
Supp. 1074, 1085 (D.N.J. 1986)). Ms. Cummings also testified at her deposition
that she would not have felt able to sign her affidavit or join in this litigation if she
had known that the plaintiff group was alleging that PDT's conduct had a direct
negative effect on her aesthetic and recreational interests in the Kill. Id. at 94 (Aldisert, J., concurring) (aldisert, J., concurring).
Affiant Sheldon Abrams alleged that a "black .. . oily sheen" existed on the
water. Id. Mr. Abrams further testified that, if the water flowing from the Kill into
the New York Bay was cleaner, he would enjoy boating on the Bay to a greater
extent. Id. Mr. Abrams also stated that he owned no real estate on or near the New
York Bay or the Kill Van Kull. Id. Mr. Abrams did not recreate along the Kill and
described his interests in the Kill as "very generalized." Id. Mr. Abrams stated that
he had no claim that he was being directly adversely affected by any conduct of
PDT. Id. at 88 (Aldisert, J., concurring).
Andrew Gerbino testified that his interests were affected by any pollutant which
entered the Lower New York Bay. Id. (Aldisert, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
Finally, Mylissa Ven Ditti testified that the foul odor of the Kill diminished her enjoyment of the park. Id. PDT is not accused of dumping garbage into or near the
Kill. Id. Ven Ditti also asserted that she had no interest being affected by the conduct of PDT. Id.
127 Id. at 89 (Aldisert, J., concurring).
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majority and found standing. 28 Thejudge, influenced by public
policy concerns respecting the environment, 29 hesitantly agreed
that PIRG's members were injured by the defendant's acts.'3 °
Judge Aldisert ultimately endorsed a liberal attitude toward
standing in the area of environmental law, but was not entirely
certain that the court's decision would survive Supreme Court
review.'t'
Historically, courts have applied inconsistent standing analyses.'1 2 In doing so, the courts have used a wide range of tests,
typically striving to liberalize standing within the mandates of arId. at 83 (Aldisert, J., concurring).
Id. at 89 (Aldisert, J., concurring). Judge Aldisert suggested that his decision
was influenced by the monumental nature of environmental concerns. Id.
130 Id. (Aldisert, J., concurring).
131 Id. at 84 (Aldisert, J., concurring). Despite Judge Aldisert's hope that the
United States Supreme Court would maintain its liberal environmental standing
requirements, the judge noted a Supreme Court opinion, handed down shortly
before the PIRG opinion, which provided some insight into the Court's view on
environmental standing. Id. In Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 110 S. Ct. 3177
(1990), the National Wildlife Federation claimed a right to judicial review of the
Bureau of Land Management's land. Lujan, 110 S. Ct. 3177, 3185 (1990). Under
the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), a party asserting a claim must show that it
has suffered a legal wrong or been affected adversely by some agency action, the
Court explained. Id. at 3185-86. The Court further stated that the aggrieved party
must show by specific facts that his injury falls within the interests to be protected
by the statute under which the claim is asserted. Id. at 3186.
The Court conceded that the zone of interest tier was met because the plaintiff's recreational and aesthetic interests were intended to be statutorily protected.
Id. at 3187. The Court, however, questioned whether these interests were actually
affected by the review program. Id.
In a 5- 4 decision, the Court held that averments that one member of the plaintiff organization uses an unspecified portion of a two million acre area, of which
some portions have been mined or may be mined as a result of the bureau's actions,
are adequate to sustain a summary judgment motion on the standing issue. Id. at
3188-89. Conclusory allegations, the Court explained, which are unsupported by
the specific facts, fail to create a genuine issue of material fact. Id. at 3195.
The Court specifically rejected the SCRAP decision as inapposite, noting that
such an expansive view of the APA has not been repeated since the SCRAP decision. Id. at 3189. The Court further distinguished SCRAP as unpersuasive because
the review at issue in Lujan concerned a summary judgment motion rather than a
motion on the pleadings, which assumes that general allegations contain facts necessary to support the asserted cause of action. Id. (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S.
41, 45-46 (1957)).
Judge Aldisert, therefore, interpreted the Lujan decision as an indication that
the Supreme Court is not willing to completely relax the requirements for standing
in environmental cases. PIRG, 913 F.2d at 84 (Aldisert, J., concurring). The senior
judge reasoned that if the Court requires a minimum level of specificity "to prove
standing under a statute, it follows, afortiori, that the Court requires some stringency in meeting Article III standing." Id. (Aldisert, J., concurring).
132 See supra note 9.
128
129
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ticle III. In refining the causation standard set forth in Duke,13 3
the PIRG court clearly displayed its unwillingness to require
heightened causation requirements in environmental litigation. ' 4 By enunciating a liberal causation standard, the court
properly allowed citizen groups to enforce NPDES permits and
effectuated the FWPCA's intent. I13 Appropriately, the court did
not require the plaintiff to name all the alleged polluters as defendants nor definitely establish causation through the pleadings.
A contrary holding would have overburdened the plaintiffs and
discouraged citizen enforcement of environmental laws.' 3 6 The
enunciated standard assures that citizens will generally be able to
establish causation.
It is, however, questionable whether the court's causation
standard falls within the confines of article III. The causation tier
of the standing doctrine essentially ensures that courts address
only actual cases or controversies. 13 7 In the absence of a causal
relationship between the alleged injury and the defendant's actions, parties would be able to institute legal action despite the
court's inability to remedy the legal invasion. The Third Circuit's
application of the Duke causation standard illustrates how far a
court may challenge article III limits. Although PDT's oil and
grease discharges likely contributed to the Kill's oil content, the
degree of damage caused directly by PDT was de minimis in light
of the Kill's perilous condition. The quality of the waterway,
however, should not potentially defeat the liability of a disSee supra notes 76-82 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 76-82 and accompanying text.
135 See supra note 33.
136 Many would find this outcome troubling as citizen enforcement has become
an important procedure in light of inadequate governmental diligence. J. BONNIE &
T. MCGARITY, THE LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, § B.1, at 903 (1984). See
also Andreen, Beyond Words of Exhortation: The CongressionalPrescriptionfor Vigorous Federal Enforcement of the Clean Water Act, 55 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 202, 203-04 (1987).
Between 1977 and 1982, EPA enforcement of the Clean Water Act dropped 73.1%.
Id. at 204-05. A 41.5% fall in compliance inspections occurred, accompanied by a
25.5 % decrease in personnel assigned to enforcement of the Clean Water Act. Id.
During this period of nonenforcement, 82% of NPDES permit holders violated permit parameters at least one time. Id. at 205. Twenty-four percent of permit holders
were considered to be in "significant noncompliance" during this time period. Id.
"Significant noncompliance" occurred when the polluter exceeded at least one
concentration or quality limit by 50% or more in a period of four consecutive
months during the eighteen-month permit period. Id. at 205 n. 25 (quoting U.S.
General Accounting Office, WASTEWATER DISCHARGERS ARE NOT COMPLYING WITH
EPA POLLUTION CONTROL PERMITS 9 (1983)).
137 See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text.
133
134

150

SETON HALL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 22:127

charger who compromised the environment in view of its profit
margin.
The Third Circuit has, thus, judicially determined that
"identifiable trifles" sufficiently establish causation. 3 8 Therefore, any polluter may be held accountable despite a seemingly
insignificant contribution to the alleged harm. 3 9 Despite the
constitutional import of standing, it has pragmatically evolved
into a mere technicality 40 and courts face frequent criticism for
its inconsistent application. 4 ' Many commentators have called
for the change or demise of the procedural requirement in environmental litigation. 42 Difficulties accompanying the application of standing may be avoided by imposing strict liability on
any discharger violating its permit parameters. Presently increasing concerns for the environment require strict regulation and
thorough enforcement of environmentally unsafe behavior. Such
action would conclusively grant standing to all citizens against
See supra notes 65 and 66.
It may be argued that the court simply chose an inappropriate example of
causation by using the oil discharges to establish causation.
140 See ROGDERS, ENVIRONMENTAL LAw § 1.6, at 24 (1977).
141 See supra note 9. The inconsistent application has been criticized as a product
of value-laden and result-oriented adjudication by the court. Comment, supra note
2, at 137. It is asserted that standing has been manipulated in order to avoid issues,
to address desirable issues, to reflect subjective values regarding certain matters or
to avoid or address issues based on the merits of the plaintiff's claim. Id.
142 See Nichol, Abusing Standing: A Comment on Allen v. Wright, 133 U. PA. L. REV.
635 (1985); Fallon, Of Justiciability, Remedies, and Public Law Litigation: Notes on the
Jurisprudenceof Lyons, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1984); Tushnet, see supra note 9, at 663;
Albert, Standing to Challenge Administrative Actions: An Inadequate Surrogatefor Claimsfor
Relief, 83 YALE L.J. 425 (1974); Stone, Should Trees Have Standing? - Toward Legal
Rightsfor Natural Objects, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 450 (1972).
As the basis ofJustice Douglas' dissent in Sierra Club v. Morton, Professor Stone
calls for the grant of standing to objects of nature. See Stone, supra, at 456.
Although Stone limited his discourse to natural objects, specifically excluding animals from the proposed grant of standing, cases have been instituted in the name
of animals. See, e.g., Mt. Graham Red Squirrel v. Yeutter, 930 F.2d 703 (9th Cir.
1991) (Sierra Club instituted suit in name of endangered squirrel alleged to be
harmed by challenged construction); Palila v. Hawaii Dept. of Land & Natural Resources, 471 F. Supp. 985 (D. Haw. 1979), aff'd, 639 F.2d 495 (9th Cir. 1981) (action instituted in name of endangered bird seeking removal of sheep alleged to be
destroying the bird's habitat). Professor Stone proposed that the natural objects
actually be granted limited legal rights. See Stone, supra, at 458. A guardian may
then institute legal action in the name of the objects to seek protection of the environment. Id. at 465. In this way, the requirements of establishing injury and use
would be avoided while fulfilling the case or controversy prerequisites. Id. at 466,
471. Stone has been criticized, not only for the practical problems of instituting the
concept, but also for assuming that the appointed guardian would assert the environmentalist position. Sagoff, On Preserving the Natural Environment, 84 YALE L.J.
205, 221 (1974).
138
139
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environmental polluters and end the unnecessary and controversial debate.
Alison L. Galer

